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Abstract 
 
On April 16th, The White House launched “Opening up America Again” (OuAA) campaign while 
many U.S. counties had stay-at-home orders in place. We created a panel data set of 1,563 U.S. 
counties to study the impact of U.S. counties’ stay-at-home orders on community mobility before 
and after The White House’s campaign to reopen the country. Our results suggest that before the 
OuAA campaign stay-at-home orders were effective in decreasing time spent at retail & recreation 
places and in increasing time spent at home. These stay-at-home orders were less effective in more 
conservative counties. We further find that the OuAA campaign significantly increased time spent at 
retail & recreation places and decreased time spent at home particularly in conservative counties. 
However, in conservative counties with stay-at-home orders in place, OuAA campaign was less 
effective when compared to conservative counties without stay-at-home orders. These findings 
signal promising news for local (county and state) authorities. That is, even when the federal 
government is reopening the country, the local authorities that enforced stay-at-home restrictions 
were to some extent effective. 
Keywords: COVID-19, stay-at-home, opening up America, quasi-experiment, difference-in-difference, matched 
samples, political ideology 
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Introduction: 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been raging in the world since December 2019. The United States 
reported its first COVID-19 patient in January 21st, 2020.1 As of August 12, 2020 there are over 5 
million confirmed cases in U.S. with a death tally of over 165,000.2 The immense impact of 
COVID-19 pandemic on the lives of billions of people has forced authorities to devise response 
strategies to contain the damage. From enforcing stay-at-home orders to restrict public and private 
gatherings to wearing masks and social distancing, the authorities have come up with a variety of 
response strategies. These restrictive strategies are effective only if they are adhered to by citizens. 
Given the diverse set of opinions held by citizens, their level of adherence to the restrictions could 
be different. Results from initial research studies provide some evidence of these differences based 
on residents’ political beliefs. For instance, Painter and Qiu (2020) found that residents’ political 
beliefs affects their compliance with social distancing orders that are imposed as a response to the 
spread of COVID-19. Their findings reveal that counties that voted for President Trump in 2016 
presidential election are more likely to disobey the social distancing orders. Another study by 
Grossman et al. (2020) also revealed that the Democratic counties were more likely to obey stay-at-
home orders enforced by the state governor. They also found that Democratic counties with 
Republican governors are more likely to stay at home when compared to other counties. Overall, the 
current research signals the impact of stay-at-home orders on residents’ stay-at-home behaviors. 
Although both studies offer similar findings, they both use data from SafeGraph’s shelter-in-place 
data.3 This data set uses a sample of users’ cell phone locations to determine the time stayed at 
home. However, we believe that another data set published by Google would be more informative 
as it not only includes data about stay at home time, but also it includes data about the amount of 
 
1 https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165  
2 https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html  
3 https://www.safegraph.com/dashboard/covid19-shelter-in-place?s=US&d=08-20-2020&t=counties&m=index  
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time users spend in retail & recreation locations (such as bars, restaurants, and gyms), grocery stores, 
parks, places of work, and transit locations. We believe that such data would be more informative in 
measuring the impact of stay-at-home orders.  
Another distinction between our research and prior studies is about the federal government’s 
intervention: “[w]e are starting our life AGAIN!,”4 said the U.S. president during his Coronavirus 
Task Force press briefing on April 16th. A day earlier, during another press briefing, the president 
claimed that the U.S. has “passed the pick on new cases.”5 Yet a couple of days before that, on April 
13th, he also claimed “total authority”6 over governors. The three Coronavirus Task Force press 
briefings on April 13th, 15th, and 16th mark a major shift in U.S. president’s response policy regarding 
the pandemic. A new policy that was also cascaded in president’s tweets (see Figure 1). What 
followed this new policy was a set of guidelines7 to open up America. The White House launched 
“Opening up America Again” (OuAA) website on Arpil 16th. Along with these guidelines, president 
Trump used his powerful Twitter account to encourage protestors (mainly composed of his 
supporters) to “liberate” Michigan and Minnesota, two states with Democratic governors who 
imposed strict social distancing restrictions (Shear and Mervosh 2020).  
 
4 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-
coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-27/  
5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-
coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-26/  
6 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-
coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-25/  
7 https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/  
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Figure 1. President Trump’s Tweets about his “Opening Up America Again” Campaign 
 
In this study, we use weekly panel data about U.S. counties’ community mobility, unemployment 
rate, political orientation and COVID-19 cases and deaths along with stay-at-home and shelter-in-
place restrictions to understand the impact of stay-at-home orders on community mobility and to 
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what extent this impact is moderated by the political orientation of the county and by the OuAA 
campaign. Our findings reveal that: 
1- Stay-at-home and shelter-in-place restrictions imposed by counties and states decreased time 
spent at retail & recreation places such as bars, restaurants, gyms, and movie theatres, and 
increased time spent at residential places.  
2- Liberal counties spent more time at home and less time at retail stores compared to 
conservative counties during the stay-at-home orders.  
3- Liberal counties spent more time at home and less time at retail stores compared to 
conservative counties after OuAA campaign launched by the White House.  
4- Conservative counties that had a stay-at-home order in place spent more time at home and 
less at retail & recreation places even after OuAA campaign launch when compared to 
conservative counties that did not have stay-at-home order in place.  
Our results are based on a quasi-experimental setting and we have controlled for the number of 
cases and deaths per 100k population, county fixed effects, time fixed effects and the interaction of 
state and time fixed effects. We also examined the robustness of our findings by running the models 
using a matched sample of counties. We used county level data about residents’ education, 
population, deaths, births, domestic and international migration, percent below federal poverty line, 
unemployment rate, and median household income. In this brief summary, we report our study 
design, data analysis, and preliminary findings.  
Data: 
We created a panel data set of U.S. counties by collecting data about community mobility scores, 
COVID-19 new cases and deaths (adjusted by population), ideological orientation of counties, and 
state’s COVID-19 response data (stay-at-home, shelter-in-place, and other types of restrictions and 
their timelines) for the period between the first week of March 2020 and the first week of June 2020. 
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From 3,141 U.S. counties, we removed any county that did not have a value for the variables in our 
models. For instance, many counties did not have a value for the community mobility indices (Retail 
and Residential described in table 1). After removing the counties with missing values, we ended up 
with panel data of 1,563 counties and 14 weeks. Below, we describe the sources of data and our data 
collection approach:   
1- Community Mobility Data: 
This data set was obtained from Google.8 Google’s community mobility dataset “shows how visits 
to places, such as grocery stores and parks, are changing in each geographic region.”9 According to 
the documentations, this dataset shows how visits and length of stay at different places change 
compared to a baseline. The baseline is the median value, for the corresponding day of the week, 
during the 5-week period Jan 3–Feb 6, 2020. Google indicates that the data is included in the 
calculations based on user settings, connectivity, and whether there is any privacy concern (due to 
small sample size in some areas). If there are any concerns regarding the privacy of Google’s users, 
the data fields will be left empty. Due to these omitted values, we did not include counties with 
missing values.  
Google’s community mobility data set includes six categories of places: grocery & pharmacy, parks, 
transit stations, retail & recreation, residential, and workplaces. From these six categories, we used 
retail & recreation and residential categories. The reason why we limited our study to these two 
categories is that these two categories portray a more accurate picture of community mobility during 
the pandemic. Retail & recreation category includes mobility trends for places like restaurants, cafes, 
shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, and movie theatres. These businesses are non-
essential businesses that could be avoided during the pandemic. If stay-at-home orders are effective, 
 
8 https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/  
9 https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/data_documentation.html?hl=en  
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we would expect a decrease in retail & recreation trend. Residential category refers to the mobility 
trends of places of residence. If stay-at-home orders are effective, we would expect an upward trend 
in residential category. Other categories such as grocery & pharmacy stores, workplaces, and transit 
stations are either essential or determined by the employers rather than the residents. Therefore, 
trends in grocery & pharmacy stores, workplaces, and transit stations may not provide us with a 
reasonable pattern about residents’ will in adhering to stay-at-home orders and other types of 
restrictions. We also excluded parks mobility trends because visiting such places would be possible 
with very limited risk of infection (people could stay six feet apart in the open areas). With that said, 
we created two dependent variables Retail & Residential based on Google’s mobility trends for retail 
& recreations and residential places respectively. 
2- COVID-19 Data: 
This data set was obtained from NY Times’ GitHub page.10 This dataset includes the number of 
cases and the number of deaths per day per county per 100k residents. 
3- Ideological Orientation Data:  
This data set was obtained from American Ideology Project.11 We used the 2016 release of “County-
Level Preference Estimates”. From this data file, we used variable mrp_mean, which is the estimate of 
the mean ideology of the county. This measure ranges from a negative number to a positive number. 
The smallest value in mrp_mean represents the most liberal county, while the largest value in 
mrp_mean is associated with the most conservative county. Therefore, we can interpret mrp_mean as a 
metric for gauging the level of conservativeness of a county. Hence, in our study, we call this 
variable conservative. In the 2016 release of the data, conservative ranges from -1.098 (the least 
conservative county) to 0.842 (the most conservative county). The methodology for estimating 
ideological orientation scores is described in Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013).  
 
10 https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data  
11 https://americanideologyproject.com 
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4- County-level Restrictions Data: 
This data set was obtained from a GitHub repository.12 The data summaries and the methods used 
for assembling the data sets are detailed in Killeen et al. (2020). There are multiple data files in the 
data repository, from which we used “interventions.csv” data file. This data file contains the dates 
that counties (or states governing them) enforced policies (such stay-at-home orders) to mitigate the 
spread of COVID-19 by restricting community mobility or gatherings. In addition to the dates of 
policy enforcement initiations, this data set includes the dates the polices were rolled back. From this 
data set, we used five types of restrictions: 
1- Type 1: Stay-at-home orders  
2- Type 2: Prohibiting gatherings of 50 or more people 
3- Type 3: Prohibiting gatherings of 500 or more people 
4- Type 4: Prohibiting dine-in restaurants and bars 
5- Type 5: Closing entertainment businesses and gyms  
Type 1 is the main variable of interest in our study. We use Type 2 through Type 5 as control 
variables in our models.  
6- County-level socio-economic data: 
This data set was obtained from The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).13 and includes 
information about the socio-economic indicators at the county level. In particular, this data set 
includes information about education level, population estimates including national and international 
migration, poverty, and unemployment. 
Variables: 
Table 1 reports the list of variables, their descriptions, and their summary statistics. Figure 2 reports 
the correlation coefficients. Our data set includes data about 1,563 counties over a 14-week period 
 
12 https://github.com/JieYingWu/COVID-19_US_County-level_Summaries  
13 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-data-sets/download-data/ 
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(from the 10th week of 2020 through the 23rd week of 2020). This is a period that covers the first 
peak in the number of cases in the U.S. and includes the time before and after the roll out of the 
OuAA campaign by The White House. Furthermore, many counties and states enforced stay-at-
home orders during this time period. Some of those restrictions were lifted again in the same time 
frame of our study.  
We excluded observations with any missing value from the data set. This resulted in 18,769 
observations with complete data. As mentioned before, the community mobility indices (Retail and 
Residential) were obtained from Google’s Community Mobility Report. According to Google, these 
data are based on “data from users who have opted-in to Location History for their Google 
Account”.14 Retail and Residential indices reflect the change in users’ locations based on a baseline. 
Per Google’s documentation, the baseline is the median value, for the corresponding day of the 
week, during the 5-week period January 3rd through February 6th 2020. A negative value for Retail 
means that users spent less time in retail stores compared to the baseline timeframe. A positive score 
for Residential means that the users spent more time at a residential location (i.e. home) compared to 
the baseline timeframe.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Description Count Mean Std. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variables: 
      
Retail 
Mobility trends for places 
like restaurants, cafes, 
shopping centers, theme 
parks, museums, libraries, 
and movie theaters. 
18,769 -18.420 22.970 -86.571 100.333 
Residential Mobility trends for places of residence. 18,769 11.050 7.395 -4.000 31.428 
Independent 
Variables: 
      
stay Whether the county enforced a stay-at-home 
Not Enforced: 9,288 
Enforced: 9,481 
 
14 https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/data_documentation.html?hl=en  
 10 
or a shelter-in-place order 
during the focal week. 
post_reopen 
Equals 1 on or after week 
of April 13th and zero 
otherwise. 
Before OuAA: 8,365 
After OuAA: 10,404 
conservative 
Ideological orientation of 
each county. This variable 
measures to what extent a 
county is conservative 
18,769 0.177 0.318 -1.098 0.842 
Control 
Variables: 
      
cases15 
Number of daily new cases 
per 100k residents 
averaged per week 
18,769 3.941 5.741 -14.670 389.368 
deaths 
Number of daily new 
deaths per 100k residents 
averaged per week 
18,769 0.178 0.305 -1.030 8.993 
unemployment Weekly unemployment rate in the county 18,769 9.825 5.529 1.800 34.300 
gathering50 
Whether gatherings of 50 
or more were banned in 
the county during the 
focal week. 
Not Enforced: 4,518 
Enforced: 14,251 
gathering500 
Whether gatherings of 500 
or more were banned in 
the county during the 
focal week. 
Not Enforced: 3,664 
Enforced: 15,105 
dine_in 
Whether restaurant dine-
ins were prohibited in the 
county during the focal 
week. 
Not Enforced: 6,722 
Enforced: 12,047 
gym 
Whether entertainment 
businesses and gyms were 
closed in the county 
during the focal week. 
Not Enforced: 6,689 
Enforced: 12,080 
 
 
15 In some rare cases, the number of daily cases and deaths are negative. This is because of the adjustments made 
to the counts made for the previous days. 
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Figure 2. Correlation Matrix (Correlation Coefficients) 
 
Figure 3 visualizes the degree to which counties enforced restrictions (such as stay-at-home orders, 
prohibiting gatherings, closing gyms, …) between March 23rd and May 8th 2020. Darker colors 
represent more lenient restrictions or no restrictions at all, while lighter colors represent more strict 
restrictions.     
 
Figure 3. Average County-level Stay-at-home Restrictions Color-coded Based on Longevity 
of Orders (counties with darker colors enforced stay-at-home orders for a longer period)  
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Figure 4 compares the length of stay-at-home restrictions in U.S. states. The bars represent the week 
at least one county within the state enforced a stay-at-home order. New York, California, and New 
Jersey are among the states with longer duration of stay-at-home orders at least in one of their 
counties.  
 
Figure 4. Duration of stay-at-home Restrictions in U.S. States 
 
The two plots in Figure 5 visualize the average weekly trend in Retail (a) and Residential (b) indices 
over the period of our study. We separated the counties based on their ideological orientation (i.e. 
conservative). The counties with above median ideology score are labeled as Conservative and 
counties with an ideology score below the median are labeled as Liberal. According to the plots 
conservative counties spent more time at retail locations and less time at residential locations. Also, 
we can observe that the retail activity in both conservative and liberal counties started to increase 
after week 15. We can also observe that both liberal and conservative counties spent less time at 
residential locations after OuAA campaign.  
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(a) Retail Index 
 
(b) Residential Index 
Figure 5. Weekly Changes in Retail and Residential Indices by Ideological Groups 
 
Before we introduce our econometric model, we present model-free comparisons of Retail and 
Residential indices in U.S. counties based on stay-at-home orders, counties’ ideological category 
(conservative county) and OuAA campaign. According to Table 2, in liberal counties (conservative 
county = 0) that did not have stay-at-home order in place (stay-at-home order = 0), the value of 
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Retail changed from -29.250 to -15.637 (increase in retail & recreation activity) and the value for 
Residential decreased from 11.988 to 11.750 after the launch of OuAA campaign. For conservative 
counties without stay-at-home order the value for Retail changed from -24.656 to -4.126 and the 
value for Residential changed from 10.763 to 9.349. In liberal counties that with stay-at-home order in 
place, the value of Retail changed from -43.025 to -29.852 (increase in retail & recreation activity) 
and the value for Residential decreased from 18.028 to 15.183 after the launch of OuAA campaign 
after the launch of OuAA campaign. For conservative counties without stay-at-home order the value 
for Retail changed from -37.070 to -17.063 and the value for Residential changed from 15.898 to 
12.318 after the launch of OuAA campaign.  
Table 2. Model-free Comparison of U.S. Counties 
Stay-at-
home Order 
Conservative 
County 
After OuAA 
Campaign Retail Residential 
0 0 0 -29.250 11.988 
0 0 1 -15.637 11.750 
0 1 0 -24.656 10.763 
0 1 1 -4.126 9.349 
1 0 0 -43.025 18.028 
1 0 1 -29.852 15.183 
1 1 0 -37.070 15.898 
1 1 1 -17.063 12.318 
 
Econometric Model: 
We use the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) study design to understand the impact of stay-at-home 
orders on community mobility. The enforcement of stay-at-home orders by counties over time 
creates a natural experiment setting that allows the comparison of difference in community mobility 
before and after enforcing the stay-at-home orders across the counties. We further address the 
endogeneity of stay-at-home order decisions using a matched sample of counties (a match between 
counties that enforced an order and counties that never did). To assess the effect of stay-at-home 
orders on community mobility indices, we employ the following model: 
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 𝑦!"# = 	𝛼 + 𝛽$	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦!"# + 𝛽%	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦!"# × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒!" + 𝛽&	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛# × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒!" +𝛽'	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦!"# × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛# + 𝛽(	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦!"# × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛# × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒!" + 𝛽)	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# +𝛽*	𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠!"# +	𝛽+	𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# + 𝛽,	𝑔𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔50!"# +	𝛽-	𝑔𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔500!"# +𝛽%$	𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒_𝑖𝑛!"# + 𝛽%%	𝑔𝑦𝑚!"# +	𝛿# + 𝜁!" + 𝛿# × 𝜉" + 𝜖!"# 
Where i represents the county, s represents the state, and t represents the week. 𝑦!"# is the 
community mobility index (i.e. Retail or Residential). We are interested in 𝛽$ through 𝛽(. 𝛽$ is the 
DiD coefficient and 𝛽% through 𝛽( capture the interaction effects between stay and conservative, 
post_reopen and conservative, and stay, post_reopen, and conservative respectively. 𝛽) through 𝛽%% capture 
the effects of the control variables. 𝛿# captures time-fixed effects, 𝜁!" captures county-fixed effects, 
and 𝛿# × 𝜉" capture the interaction between time- and state-fixed effects. 
Results:  
Table 3 reports the result of our DiD analysis. For stay-at-home orders to be effective, we expect a 
drop in Retail and a jump in Residential. In models 1 through 3, the coefficient for stay is negative and 
significant. That is, retail & recreation activities decreased in counties that had a stay-at-home order 
after controlling for number of cases and deaths per 100k, unemployment rate, other types of 
restrictions, county-fixed effects, time-fixed effects, and the interaction of time- and state-fixed 
effects. In models 4 through 6, the coefficient for stay is positive and significant. This indicates that 
stay-at-home orders were effective in keeping residents at home. In model 2, the interaction between 
stay and conservative is positive and significant. This means that more conservative counties had more 
retail & recreation activities than liberal counties. In model 5 the coefficient for this interaction is 
negative and significant. This indicates that the conservative counties spent less time at home during 
the stay-at-home enforcement. In model 3, the interaction between post_reopen and conservative is 
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positive and significant, which indicates that the conservative counties had more retail & recreation 
activities than liberal counties after OuAA campaign launch. This coefficient is negative and 
significant in model 6, suggesting more conservative counties stayed less at home after OuAA 
campaign launch compared to less conservative counties. In model 3, the interaction between stay, 
post_reopen, and conservative is negative and significant. This means that conservative counties that had 
a stay-at-home order enforced had less retail & recreation activities after OuAA launch compared to 
conservative counties that did not. The three-way interaction coefficient in model 6 also suggest that 
the conservative counties with stay-at-home order in place spent more time at home after the launch 
of OuAA campaign compared to conservative counties that did not.  
Table 3. The Impact of “stay-at-home” orders and “Reopen America” on Community 
Mobility Indices in U.S. Counties 
 Retail Residential 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
stay 
-2.590*** 
[0.475] 
-3.172*** 
[0.475] 
-2.687*** 
[0.625] 
1.137*** 
[0.123] 
1.372*** 
[0.122] 
1.813*** 
[0.165] 
stay × conservative  3.932*** [0.331] 3.538*** [0.457]  -1.590*** [0.085] -2.534*** [0.120] 
post_reopen × conservative   13.695*** [0.439]   -2.825*** [0.116] 
stay × post_reopen   -0.999 [0.875]   -0.862*** [0.230] 
stay × post_reopen × 
conservative   
-5.170*** 
[0.616]   
2.606*** 
[0.162] 
cases 
-0.051*** 
[0.005] 
-0.049*** 
[0.005] 
-0.052*** 
[0.005] 
0.019*** 
[0.001] 
0.018*** 
[0.001] 
0.018*** 
[0.001] 
deaths 
-0.535*** 
[0.111] 
-0.449*** 
[0.111] 
-0.307** 
[0.106] 
0.229*** 
[0.029] 
0.194*** 
[0.028] 
0.180*** 
[0.028] 
unemployment 
-0.691*** 
[0.030] 
-0.683*** 
[0.030] 
-0.518*** 
[0.029] 
0.145*** 
[0.008] 
0.142*** 
[0.008] 
0.116*** 
[0.008] 
other county restrictions ü ü ü ü ü ü 
time fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü ü 
county fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü ü 
time fixed effects × state fixed 
effects ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Observations 18,769 18,769 18,769 18,769 18,769 18,769 𝑅! 0.929 0.930 0.936 0.957 0.958 0.959 
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F-statistic 338.108*** 340.659*** 370.266*** 573.525*** 585.174*** 604.519*** 
 
To better interpret the results for the three-way interaction terms, consider the following counties: 
Example of a conservative county: Let’s consider a county with a score of one standard deviation 
above the mean for variable conservative. According to Table 1, this translate to 0.177 + 0.318 = 
0.495. If this county had a stay-at-home order in place, per results reported for model 3 in Table 3, 
the expected value of Retail would increase from (-2.688 × 1) + (3.538 × 1 × 0.495) = -0.936 to -
2.688 + (3.538 × 1 × 0.495) + (13.695 × 1 × 0.495) + (– 0.999 × 1 × 1) + (-5.170 × 1 × 1 × 
0.495) = 2.285 after the launch of OuAA campaign. If this county did not have a stay-at-home 
order, the value for Retail would increase further to (13.695 × 1 × 0.495) = 6.799. 
If this county had a stay-at-home order in place, per results reported for model 6 in Table 3, the 
expected value of Residential would decrease from (1.813 × 1) + (-2.534 × 1 × 0.495) = 0.559 to 
(1.813 × 1) + (-2.534 × 1 × 0.495) + (-2.825 × 1 × 0.495) + (– 0.862 × 1 × 1) + (2.606 × 1 × 1  × 
0.495) = -0.412 after the launch of OuAA campaign. If this county did not have a stay-at-home 
order, the value for Residential would further decrease to (-2.825 × 1 × 0.495) = -0.427. 
Example of a liberal county: we can now consider a county with a score of one standard deviation 
below the mean for variable conservative. According to Table 1, this translate to 0.177 - 0.318 = -
0.141. If this county had a stay-at-home order in place, per results reported for model 3 in Table 3, 
the expected value of Retail would decrease from (-2.688 × 1) + (3.538 × 1 × -0.141) = -3.186 to (-
2.688 × 1)+ (3.538 × 1 × -0.141) + (13.695 × 1 × -0.141) + (– 0.999 × 1 × 1) + (-5.170 × 1 × 1 × 
-0.141) = -5.387 after the launch of OuAA campaign. If this county did not have a stay-at-home 
order, the value for Retail would increase to (13.695 × 1 × -0.141) = -1.931.  
If this county had a stay-at-home order in place, per results reported for model 6 in Table 3, the 
expected value of Residential would decrease from (1.813 × 1) + (-2.534 × 1 × -0.141) = 2.170 to 
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(1.813 × 1) + (-2.534 × 1 × -0.141) + (-2.825 × 1 × -0.141) + (– 0.862 × 1 × 1) + (2.606 × 1 × 1  × -0.141) = 1.339 after the launch of OuAA campaign. If this county did not have a stay-at-home 
order, the value for Residential would further decrease to (-2.825 × 1 × -0.141) = 0.122. 
Robustness Checks: 
Given that the decision to enforce stay-at-home orders could be endogenous, we used propensity 
score matching to find the best match for each county that had no stay-at-home enforcement with a 
similar county that enforced state-at-home order in place. We used county level data about residents’ 
education, population, deaths, births, domestic and international migration, percent below federal 
poverty line, unemployment rate, and median household income to find similar counties (matches 
for counties that did not have stay-at-home orders). This resulted in 660 counties (330 counties 
without any stay-at-home order and 330 similar counties with some level of stay-at-home 
enforcement). We reran our analysis using the matched samples. The results are reported in Table 4. 
According to the results reported in this table, our findings are robust.  
Table 4. Results Based on Matched Samples  
 Retail Residential 
Variables Model 7 Model 6 
Stay 
-3.740* 
[1.506] 
1.942*** 
[0.409] 
stay × conservative 6.999*** [1.108] -2.497*** [0.301] 
post_reopen × conservative 7.168*** [0.771] -1.091*** [0.209] 
stay × post_reopen -1.162 [2.293] -1.350* [0.623] 
stay × post_reopen × conservative -3.053*** [1.372] 0.899* [0.373] 
cases 
-0.068*** 
[0.008] 
0.020*** 
[0.002] 
deaths 
-0.541* 
[0.215] 
0.255*** 
[0.058] 
unemployment 
-0.294*** 
[0.054] 
0.158*** 
[0.015] 
other county restrictions ü ü 
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time fixed effects ü ü 
county fixed effects ü ü 
time fixed effects × state fixed effects ü ü 
Observations 6,292 6,292 𝑅! 0.936 0.955 
F-statistic 138.989*** 198.916*** 
Conclusion: 
The immense impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the lives of billions of people has forced 
authorities to devise response strategies to contain the damage. We created a panel data set of 1,563 
U.S. counties by collecting data about weekly community mobility scores, weekly COVID-19 new 
cases and deaths, ideological orientation of counties, and state’s COVID-19 response data (stay-at-
home and shelter-in-place restrictions timelines) for the period between the first week of March 
2020 and the first week of June 2020. 
The enforcements of stay-at-home orders by counties over time created a natural experiment setting 
that allows the comparison of difference in community mobility before and after enforcing the stay-
at-home orders across the counties. We used the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) study design to 
understand the impact of stay-at-home orders on community mobility. We further address the 
endogeneity of stay-at-home order decisions using a matched sample of counties (a match between 
counties that enforced an order and counties that never did). 
Our results indicate that stay-at-home orders were effective to some extent in decreasing commute 
to retail stores and increasing time spent at home. We also find that conservative counties were more 
likely to ignore the stay-at-home orders. This finding is aligned with similar studies about partisan 
behavior in obeying coronavirus restrictions (Kushner Gadarian et al. 2020). We further find that the 
“Opening up America Again” (OuAA) campaign launched by The White House increased retail & 
recreation activities and decreased time spent at home. We also find that in conservative counties 
that enforced stay-at-home, OuAA campaign was less effective when compared to conservative 
counties without stay-at-home orders. These results suggest promising news for local authorities. 
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That is, even when the federal government is reopening the country, the local authorities that 
enforced stay-at-home restrictions were to some extent effective in decreasing the commute to retail 
stores and recreational facilities such as gyms and increasing time spent at home. Our findings 
extend the findings of previous research (Alashoor et al. 2020; Grossman et al. 2020).  
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